calculated" in the unpublished manuscript. Thus, the paper and its important findings disappeared, and Rüdin and his acolytes in both Europe and the United States continued to search for genetic justifications for their eugenic ideas. To be clear, it is not as if had Rüdin published these negative findings would his own ideology or the trajectory of Nazi eugenics have been altered. Indeed, the findings could have been justified, as Rüdin did in the unpublished manuscript, by citing the "preliminarity" of the findings and the need for larger sample sizes in the hope to find the desired effect.
So what does the Rüdin story tell us? Well, for one thing, as Kösters et al. argue, it turns out that Rüdin's calculations in this unpublished work have largely stood the test of time despite more than seventy years of theoretical and technological advances in genetics. "The search for replicable gene variants leading to the onset of affective disorders continues," Kösters et al. tell us.
But Rüdin's suppression of his own findings also raises important ethical issues that persist today concerning both what science loses when negative findings are unpublished, as well as ethical questions about the social character of science.
For example, Kösters et al. cite the work of geneticist Peter Propping, who considers the failure to report negative findings "a silent coalition. . . between an author and an editor." Publication bias in both basic science and clinical research can have far reaching consequences, including the failure to report negative findings, thus skewing the evaluation and approval process of new drugs. Publication bias can also lead to a fruitless pursuit of research that has already been completed, and calls into question the overall integrity of research [3] [4] [5] . One recent study suggests that more a quarter of all clinical trials remain unpublished [6] .
It is of course tempting to turn away from the story of Rüdin-a eugenicist and Nazi-and disregard the lessons here. Nonetheless, Rüdin provides a powerful example of the scientists' capacity to do wrong (selective non-publication of results) and to do great harm (the impact of his eugenic theories on Nazi policy). His example serves as a reminder that our sociology can impact our science in ways, both big and small. For genetics, that includes the way a variety of forces, including availability of research funds, the pressures of obtaining tenure, or an embrace of genetic reductionism can shape or limit research questions and study design.
Rüdin likely never considered the way his embrace of eugenics and National Socialism, as Kösters et al. point out, compromised "the scientific quality of his empirical studies." But we, as natural and social scientists, should be ever vigilant in considering the biases and influences of social and political context on our own work. Rüdin's story reminds us that the risks of not doing so are a persistent challenge to the ethical practice of science.
